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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.
Whether Maxfield carried his burden of proving
that there are special and important reasons for the Supreme
Court to grant his petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
II,
Whether the Utah Court of Appeals used the correct
standards of review in reaching the decision to sustain the trial
court's decision and findings and conclusions.
III.
Whether the
Rule 41(b) of the Rules of
dismissing Maxfield's case
prosecute and whether that
judicial discretion.

Court of Appeals correctly applied
Civil Procedure in involuntarily
at pretrial for failure to timely
was an appropriate exercise of

OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Maxfield v. Rushton7 et al., 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (CA
8/25/89)

P.2d

.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS

The following statutes and rules are controlling:
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 43
46
47(e)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(See Appendix)

v

40(b)
41(b)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari from a
decision from the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's
dismissal of the cause of action of Maxfield in a case Maxfield
v. Rushton for the failure at pretrial of Maxfield to be prepared
to try the case on September 15, 1987, on a matter that was filed
initially in October 1980. The trial court determined that the
dismissal on the case in chief was for the failure of the
plaintiff to timely prosecute the matter.
The issue before the Supreme Court is whether the
Supreme Court, under its authority under Rule 43, should grant
the petition of appellant before the court as well as to
determine if there is an important or special reason under the
judicial discretion of the Supreme Court to grant the writ,
recognizing it would only be done in the following cases:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a
decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in
a way that is in conflict with a decision of
this court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed

from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned
such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of
supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or
federal law which has not been, but should
be, settled by this court.
STATEMENT OF FACT^
The state of Utah obtained a judgment against a
predecessor in interest to real property owned by Mr. Reed
Maxfield.

After the state executed on the real property,

Maxfield filed suit in 1980 in Utah District Court against Owen
and Carol Rushton, who had purchased the property at the
sheriff's sale.

Maxfield alleged that the Rushtons had

wrongfully deprived him of his property by purchasing it through
an illegal sheriff's sale.

The Rushtons subsequently filed a

third-party complaint against the state of Utah, seeking
reimbursement of the purchase price of the property if the court
should find in Maxfield's favor.
The ensuing litigation continued through the next seven
years, during which time Maxfield amended his complaint twice and
attempted to amend it a third time, moved three times for summary
judgment, filed an interlocutory appeal appealing the trial
court's denial of his motion for summary judgment, objected to
trial dates on three occasions on the ground that he wished to
amend his complaint, and retained three different attorneys.
-9-

During this time Maxfield filed no certificates of readiness for
trial.
At a pretrial hearing in 1987, Maxfield moved to
continue the trial date.

The trial court denied the motion and

ordered Maxfield's action dismissed for failure to timely
prosecute, finding that Maxfield had been dilatory in prosecuting
his case.

On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, the trial

court's order was affirmed.

The Court of Appeals found that

Maxfield's conduct had been dilatory and that despite the
prodigious number of motions filed by him, "little or nothing
that Maxfield did after filing his initial complaint served to
move the case along."
Maxfield now petitions the Utah Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, claiming the Utah Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the trial court's dismissal of his case.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PETITIONER HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED A
SPECIAL OR COMPELLING REASON FOR THE
COURT TO REVIEW THIS CASE.

Rule 43 of the Rules of the Supreme Court clearly
outline the character of reasons that the court will consider in
granting a petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Maxfield has not

alleged that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict
with prior decisions of this court.

Since there is no conflict

of law requiring a settlement of legal issues by the Supreme

Court, there is no need for the court to disturb the reasoning of
the Court of Appeals in deciding this case.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Court of Appeals
decided a question of state or federal law in a way which
conflicts with the decision of this court.

Indeed, such an

assertion would be unlikely inasmuch as the Court of Appeals
specifically followed the holding of this dourt in Maxfield v.
Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 1324-25, (Utah 1975).
The appellant has not alleged that the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision that so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned
such departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of the
powers of supervision residing in the Supreme Court.
The appellant/petitioner, does not claim that this case
presents important questions of state law Which should be decided
by the Supreme Court rather than the Court of Appeals.

Maxfield

simply alleges that the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect
standard of review to the case, but does not urge upon this court
a previous constitutional claim.
While reasons outlined in Rule 43, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are neither controlling or limiting as to the type of
discretion the court can exercise in considering a petition for
Writ of Certiorari, they are certainly indicative of those areas
that should concern the court when considering taking action in a

-4-

case previously assigned for determination by that court to a
lower appellate court.
Maxfield does not make any argument in support of his
petition that in any way approaches the threshold this court must
employ when deciding to grant a discretionary petition for writ
of certiorari.

Maxfield's argument contains inaccurate

statements of fact and emotional pleas that this court may ignore
and do not justify a reversal of the Court of Appeals because
Maxfield fears he will suffer financial loss from the dismissal
with prejudice by the trial court wherein the trial court ruled
Maxfield was dilatory and failed to timely prosecute the case.
(See page 3, footnote 1, Opinion of the Court of Appeals.)

The

Court of Appeals further said at page 4 of their opinion, last
three lines, "After a thorough review of the record, we find that
Maxfield was dilatory in prosecuting the case."
Maxfield's plea to this court is clearly an attempt to
escape from the long delayed consequences of his actions and his
inactions rather than an appeal for relief from any error of law
allegedly perpetrated by the Court of Appeals upon him.

It is

important to note the Court of Appeals said further, "Such nonaction is inexcusable, not only from the standpoint of the
parties, but also because it constitutes an abuse of the judicial
process."

II.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE
CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN DECIDING
THE APPEAL BEFORE IT.

A.

The Court of Appeals fully examined the record on

the appeal and the appellants' arguments (1) that the court erred
in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute; (2) refusing
to grant summary judgment in favor of Maxfield; and (3) in
refusing to either void the sheriff's sale or grant Maxfield the
immediate right to redeem the properties and held that sustaining
Point 1 was dispositive, therefore there was no need to address
appellant's arguments 2 and 3.
The Court of Appeals examined the appeal from the Third
District Court's Memorandum Decision and Judgment of Dismissal
and determined that the court's action was not an abuse of
discretion.

At page 4 in the opinion of the Court of Appeals,

first paragraph, Judge Garff states:
It is well established that the trial
court may, on its own motion, dismiss an
action for want of prosecution under Rule
41(b). Brahser Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown, 23
Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464, 464-65 (1969);
Charlie Brown Constr. Co* v. Leisure Sports
Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). This authority is an "'inherent
power,' governed not by rule or statute but
by the control necessarily vested in courts
to manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of
case." Charlie Brown Constr. Co., 740 P.2d
at 1370 (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). Therefore, the
trial court has "a reasonable latitude of
discretion in dismissing for failure to
prosecute if a party fails to move forward
-£_

according to the rules and the directions of
the court, without justifiable excuse."
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W.
Larsen Contractor Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 878-79
(Utah 1975) (footnote omitted).
Consequently, a lower court's dismissal of a
case under Rule 41(b) will not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is clear from the record
that it has abused its discretion. Wilson v.
Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980);
Department of Social Servs. v. Romero, 609
P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980); Reliance Nat.
Life Ins. Co. v. Caine, 555 P.2d 276, 277
(Utah 1976); Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson,
29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528, 529 (1973).
B.

The Court of Appeals correctly applied Rule 41(b)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to the case and correctly
dismissed Maxfield's cause of action for "failure to timely
prosecute the case."

In Judge Orme's concurring opinion, he

states:
Sua sponte dismissal for failure to
prosecute is usually not appropriate except
when it follows a substantial period of
complete inactivity. It would be an
extraordinary case where such a dismissal
would be appropriate with trial scheduled in
just a few days, especially following a
flurry of motion activity. While the
question is a closer one for me than the main
opinion may suggest, I am persuaded this is
that extraordinary case.
In my view, what saves the dismissal in
this case from crossing into the realm of
abused discretion is this: Maxfield's latest
counsel's motion for leave to withdraw
coupled with his motion for leave to file yet
another amended complaint constituted, taken
together, a concession by Maxfield that he
was nowhere near being ready to try his case
in a matter of a few days even though the
action had been pending for the better part

of a decade. It is the length of time this
action had been pending coupled with
Maxfield's obvious unreadiness that make sua
sponte dismissal appropriate in this case.
(Emphas i s added.)
Maxfield, the petitioner/appellant, continues to
attempt to place before the court an erroneous and untrue fact
stated in paragraph 20 on page 12 of his petition for a writ of
certiorari.

This assertion is that Maxfield was "ready and

willing to proceed with trial when Judge Young entered an Order
of Dismissal."

However, in the briefs themselves and at argument

bef ore the Court of Appeals, this fact was rejected as false by
both the Rushtons and the State of Utah.

T|he Court of Appeals

correctly picked up on that dispute, resolving in the favor of
the Rushtons and the State by stating in paragraph 4 at page 2 of
the opinion of the appellate court, "On May 18, 1987, Maxfield
filed a pro se objection to the trial setting on the grounds that
he was incapable of handling this case himself and that he was in
the process of seeking new counsel."

This point was argued at

the pretrial in August 1987 by the State and by Rushtons and it
was apparent to Judge Young of the trial court that if Maxfield
was incapable of handling the case alone in May without an
attorney, he was equally incapable of handling the case without
an attorney on September 15, 1987, the date of the trial, and the
court correctly dismissed the matter in total under Rule 41(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for Maxfield's "failure to
timely prosecute the case."

C.

The Court of Appeals correctly applied the

"reasonable and rational" standard of review and weighed its
discretion against a balancing of that with giving disputants an
opportunity to be heard and do justice between them; then
sustaining the trial court's Findings of Fact and rule of law.
The Court of Appeals correctly applied reason and judgment in
review of the case pursuant to the criteria enunciated in the
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. case, 544 P.2d at 879.

The

court noted that it is not merely the lapse of time, but also
those additional five factors:

(1) The conduct of both parties;

(2) the opportunity for each party to move the case forward; (3)
what each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4)
the difficulty or prejudice that may be caused to the other side;
and (5) whether injustice may result from the dismissal.

Citing

K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean, 656 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 1982); Utah Oil
Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977).

As the record

was reviewed by the Court of Appeals measuring the conduct of
both parties against the five factors in the Westinghouse case,
the court found (1) that Maxfield's conduct was dilatory whereas
defendants attempted to move the case along; (2) that Maxfield's
behavior was more dilatory than the defendants'; (3) that
Maxfield did little or nothing after filing the complaint and the
second amended complaint to move the case along, whereas the
defendants did make attempts to move the case forward; (4) the

appellate court pointed out that the loss 0f the alleged
Maxfield's property interest (already assigned to a corporate
entity through the bankruptcy proceeding) does not outweigh the
potential damage to the defendants' case for inability to obtain
witnesses and properly prosecute the case after such a long
delay; and (5) that the case of the petitioner/appellant Maxfield
in total view simply leaves a case where there was ample
opportunity for him to prove his case but the record shows that
he simply failed to do so, concluding "such nonaction is
inexcusable not only from the standpoint of the parties but also
because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process."
D.

Rule 47(e) of the Supreme Court Rules states that

petitioner's brief for writ of certiorari must "present with
accuracy, brevity and clarity whatever is essential to a ready
and adequate understanding of the points requiring
consideration."

It is further pointed out that a failure to do

so may be a sufficient reason in and of itself for denying a
petition for certiorari.

The petitioner/appellant points out two

issues justifying review by this court:

(1) Whether the Court of

Appeals erred in not ruling on petitioner's argument that he was
entitled to summary judgment; and (2) whether the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the trial court'$ dismissal of
petitioner's case for failure to timely prosecute the action.
is apparent from the opinion that the Court of Appeals

-in-

It

specifically declined to address the first issue inasmuch as the
rule sustaining the trial court's dismissal for failure to timely
prosecute the cause of action was dispositive of the case.
page 7 of the Court of Appeals brief.)

(See

In this case, the Court

of Appeals properly declined to reach an issue which it was not
required to reach.

C.F. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346

(1936) (Justice Brandeis concurring), wherein it outlined the
principles under which the Supreme Court avoids passing upon
constitutional issues.
CONCLUSION
Clearly the facts in this case as set forth in the
record and analyzed by the Court of Appeals sustain the decision
that this case was properly handled and there was ample
justification, considering all factors, for a dismissal of the
case on its merits for failure to timely prosecute.
Supreme Court decisions:

(See Utah

K.L.C. v. McLean 656 P.2d 986 (Utah

1982); Utah Dept. of Trans, v. Hatch, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980);
Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977); Reliance Nat'l
Life Ins. v. Caine, 555 P.2d 277 (Utah 1976); Westinqhouse
Electric Supp. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876
(Utah 1975); Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975);
Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 508 P.2d 529 (Utah 1973).
Court of Appeals decisions include:

Utah

Charlie Brown Constr. Co.,

Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Orme.
GARFF, Judge:
Plaintiff and appellant, Reed Maxfield, appeals the trial
courtfs dismissal of his action against defendants and
respondents, Owen A. and Carol Rushton, and the State of Utah,
for failure to prosecute. We affirm the trial court's
dismissal of his action.
We recite only those facts pertinent to disposition of this
appeal.

Maxfield initially filed his complaint in this action on
October 20, 1980, alleging that the Rushtons had wrongfully
deprived him of his property by purchasing it through an
illegal sheriffs sale. The Rushtons filed their answer and
counterclaim on April 1, 1981, along with a third-party
complaint against the State of Utah, requesting reimbursement
of the purchase price for the property if the court should find
in Maxfield's favor. On April 14, 1981, the State answered the
Rushtons* third-party complaint and filed a third-party
complaint against Mazfield.
From October 20, 1980 until December 14, 1984, various
motions were filed by the parties, primarily by Maxfield,
resulting in obfuscation of the issues and protracted delay.
Two additional factors contributed to the delay: an eighteen
month interruption while the Rushtons were on a mission for
their church, and a bankruptcy filing by Maxfield.
The case remained in limbo for nearly two years as a result
of Maxfield*s bankruptcy. Finally, on November 18, 1986, the
Rushtons filed a certificate of readiness for trial. Ten days
later, Maxfield objected to setting the case for trial because
he wished to amend his complaint by adding further claims
against the State, his discovery was incomplete, his bankruptcy
stay was presently effective, and his new attorney needed time
to familiarize himself with the case. Despite Maxfield's
objections, on February 20, 1987, the bankruptcy court ordered
that the case could be heard in district court. Thereupon, the
State filed for an immediate trial setting.
On March 4, 1987, Maxfield's counsel withdrew because
Maxfield had failed to pay him. On March 20, 1987, the
Rushtons gave Maxfield notice to obtain substitute counsel and,
again, moved for an immediate trial setting. A hearing was
scheduled on this motion for June 1, 1987. On May 18, 1987,
Maxfield filed a pro s& objection to the trial setting on the
grounds that he was incapable of handling the case himself and
that he was in the process of seeking new counsel.
At the June 1 hearing, the court set trial for September
15, 1987, and scheduled a pretrial hearing on August 31, 1987.
All discovery was to be completed prior to August 17, 1987.
On August 10, 1987, the State certified to the court that
it had complied with Maxfieldfs discovery requests, answered
Maxfieldcs proposed second amended complaint, and moved for

OOAOOO_r»H

O

summary judgment against Maxfield. Maxfield filed a motion to
dismiss all claims by other parties against him because of his
discharge in bankruptcy and filed an objection to the trial
setting, requesting a two month continuance on the grounds that
his new counsel had scheduling problems and that he intended to
file a third amended complaint. The court scheduled a hearing
on the State's motion for summary judgment for August 24# 1987.
Between August 11 and 17, 1987, the parties filed more
miscellaneous motions. On August 17, 1987, the court denied
Maxfieldfs motion to continue the trial date or to extend
discovery time. Thereafter, Maxfield filed a response to the
State's motion for summary judgment, alleging insufficient
discovery time, and filed his third amended complaint, which
set forth a new conspiracy theory between the Rushtons and the
State.
On August 20, 1987, the State submitted a list of expected
witnesses and a certificate of compliance with Maxfield's
discovery requests. The following day, it objected to
Maxfield1s third amended complaint. The Rushtons filed a
similar objection. The trial court heard all the parties'
motions on August 24, 1987, denying Maxfield's motion to file a
third amended complaint and also the State's motion for summary
judgment.
At the pretrial hearing on August 31, 1987, the trial court
again denied the parties' prior motions. Maxfield's new
attorney moved to withdraw as counsel. The court denied
counsel's motion to withdraw, and ordered that Maxfield's
action be dismissed for failure to timely prosecute. Maxfield
subsequently appealed this order.
On appeal, Maxfield argues that the trial court erred in:
(1) dismissing his action for failure to prosecute; (2)
refusing to grant summary judgment in his favor; and (3)
refusing either to void the sheriff's sale, thereby quieting
title in his favor, or to grant him the immediate right to
redeem the properties.
The trial court dismissed Maxfield's cause of action,
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
for his "failure to timely prosecute the case."1 Such a
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), in part, states that "[f]or failure
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or
any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an
action or of any claim against him."

dismissal, under Rule 41(b), "operates as an adjudication upon
the merits" of the case.
It is well established that the trial court may, on its own
motion, dismiss an action for want of prosecution under Rule
41(b). Brasher Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown. 23 Utah 2d 247, 461
P.2d 464, 464-65 (1969); Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure
Sports Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). This
authority is an "'inherent power,' governed not by rule or
statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases." Charlie Brown Constr. Co..
740 P.2d at 1370 (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co.. 370 U.S. 626,
630-31 (1962)). Therefore, the trial court has "a reasonable
latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute
if a party fails to move forward according to the rules and the
directions of the court, without justifiable excuse."
Westinahouse Elec. S U P P I V Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor
Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975) (footnote omitted).
Consequently, a lower court's dismissal of a case under Rule
41(b) will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear from
the record that it has abused its discretion. Wilson v.
Lambert. 613 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980); Department of Social
Servs. v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980); Reliance
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Caine. 555 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1976);
Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson. 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528,
529 (1973).
A court's discretion, however, must be balanced against a
higher priority: to "afford disputants an opportunity to be
heard and to do justice between them." Westinghouse Elec.
Supply Co.. 544 P.2d at 879. Thus, there is more to consider
in determining if a dismissal for failure to prosecute is
proper than merely the amount of time elapsed since the suit
was filed. I&. The factors which we consider may include the
following: (1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; (3)
what each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4)
what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other
side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from
the dismissal. K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean. 656 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah
1982); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah
1977).
After a thorough review of the record, we find that
Maxfield was dilatory in prosecuting the case. After he filed
his complaint on October 20, 1980, he amended it twice and
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attempted to amend it yet a third time, each time adding
additional theories of the case. He moved three times for
summary judgment: the first time on March 11, 1981, prior to
joinder of the State; the second time on May 30, 1984; and the
third time on June 19, 1984, when he neglected to give adequate
notice of the hearing to opposing counsel. He filed an
interlocutory appeal in 1981, appealing the trial court's
refusal to grant his first motion for summary judgment, which
the supreme court declined to hear. He then filed a number of
miscellaneous, primarily self-serving motions over the course
of the proceedings, none of which served to move the case
forward, but were/ instead/ apparent attempts to circumvent the
denial of his motions for summary judgment. He further delayed
prosecution of the case for nearly two years by filing for
bankruptcy on December 10, 1984/ shortly before the case was to
come to trial. During this bankruptcy action# he assigned his
interest in the disputed property/ which was his major asset/
to a corporation which he allegedly owned and controlled as the
primary shareholder. Further/ on the three occasions trial
dates were set# he objected to the trial settings on the
grounds that he wished to amend his complaint/ that he was
involved in the bankruptcy proceeding/ and that his new counsel
had inadequate preparation time. During the course of the
action# he retained three different attorneys/ two of whom
withdrew from the case because of his failure to pay them. He
filed no certificates of readiness for trial and/ despite his
protests as to insufficient discovery time, no motions for the
taking of depositions.
Although the Rushtons did not answer Maxfield's complaint
for approximately six and one-half months after it was
initially filed, the rest of their conduct and that of the
State generally served to move the case along. Together, the
Rushtons and the State filed four motions indicating their
readiness for trial, one of which was filed almost immediately
after the Rushtons returned from their mission. The record
indicates that they actively pursued discovery, including the
taking of depositions, and certified twice that they had
complied with Maxfield's discovery requests. In contrast, they
had to file motions twice to compel Maxfield to comply with
their discovery requests.
In evaluating the relevant factors, we find, first, that
Maxfield*s conduct in prosecuting the case was dilatory while
defendants' overall conduct served to move the case along.

Second, although both parties were unable at times to move
the case forward, Maxfield*s behavior was more dilatory.
Maxfield was unable to prosecute the case while the Rushtons
served their eighteen month mission* However, once the
Rushtons returned, they almost immediately notified the court
that they were ready to proceed to trial. Similarly,
defendants were unable to prosecute the case during the
pendency of Maxfield1s twenty-two month bankruptcy action.
Unlike the Rushtons, however, Maxfield did not voluntarily
inform the court that his bankruptcy action was completed and
the case could move forward in district court, but, instead,
objected to trial settings and waited for the State to petition
the bankruptcy court for permission to proceed with the action.
Third, despite his prodigious number of motions, little or
nothing that Maxfield did after filing his initial complaint
served to move the case along, while virtually everything that
defendants did after the Rushtons returned home from their
mission did.
Fourth, defendants argue that, if we overrule the trial
court and remand this case for hearing on the merits, they will
be substantially prejudiced because many of their witnesses
have either forgotten the events surrounding the controversy or
have become unavailable in the nine years this case has been
pending. To rebut Maxfield's assertion that he will be
prejudiced by loss of his property interest without having had
his day in court, defendants point out that Maxfield9s property
interest is already assigned to a corporation in which he
claims to have no interest. We do not find these assertions to
be unreasonable.
Fifth, while we recognize that injustice could result from
dismissal of this case, in that Maxfield will lose whatever
interest he may have in the disputed property without having
the opportunity to argue his case on its merits, we conclude
that he had more than ample opportunity to prove his asserted
interest and simply failed to do so. Such nonaction is
inexcusable, not only from the standpoint of the parties, but
also because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process.
In Maxfield v. Fishier. 538 P.2d 1323, 1324-25 (Utah 1975),
the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court justifiably
dismissed the plaintiff's case because she had been dilatory in
responding to the defendant's efforts at discovery, had
resisted attempts made by the defendant to get the case to
trial, was not ready to proceed at the time of the trial date
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because of inexcusable neglect, and had no justification for
continuance as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b). 2 We find
that the present case is factually comparable to Maxfield v.
Fishier and other cases which have been dismissed for failure
to prosecute. See e.g.. Thompson Ditch Co., 508 P.2d at 528.
We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment in dismissing
Maxfield*s action.
this issue is
axfieltf's

spositive of the case, we decline
ning issues. Costs on appeal to

Regnal W. Garff,

I CONOJR^

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

2.

Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b) provides that,
[u]pon motion of a party, the court may in
its discretion, and upon such terms as may
be just, including the payment of costs
occasioned by such postponement, postpone
a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. If the motion is made upon the
ground of the absence of evidence, such
motion shall also set forth the
materiality of the evidence expected to be
obtained and shall show that due diligence
has been used to procure it. The court
may also require the party seeking the
continuance to state, upon affidavit or
under oath the evidence he expects to
obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon
admits that such evidence would be given,
and that it may be considered as actually
given on the trial, or offered and
excluded as improper, the trial shall not
be postponed upon that ground.

ORME, Judge (concurring specially):
Sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute is usually
not appropriate except when it follows a substantial period of
complete inactivity. It would be an extraordinary case where
such a dismissal would be appropriate with trial scheduled in
just a few days, especially following a flurry of motion
activity. While the question is a closer one for me than the
main opinion may suggest, I am persuaded this is that
extraordinary case.
In my view, what saves the dismissal in this case from
crossing into the realm of abused discretion is this:
Maxfieldfs latest counselfs motion for leave to withdraw
coupled with his motion for leave to file yet another amended
complaint constituted, taken together, a concession by Maxfield
that he was nowhere near being ready to try his case in a
matter of a few days even though the action had been pending
for the better part of a decade. It is the length of time this
action had been pending coupled with Maxfieldfs obvious
unreadiness that make sua sponte dismissal appropriate in this
case. I reiterate, however, that in the ordinary case where a
trial date is set, potentially dispositive motions have been
denied at a recent pretrial, and all parties are represented by
counsel, however reluctant such representation might be, the
appropriate course for the court is simply to try the case,
even though earlier periods of inaction may exist.
I also wish to comment on two aspects of the main
opinion's analysis of the parties* comparative culpability in
connection with the delays which plagued this case. First, the
opinion says that "Maxfield was unable to prosecute the case
while the Rushtons served their eighteen month mission10 and
seems to imply that the Rushtons were likewise relieved of
their duty to move the case along during that period. However,
voluntary absence from the jurisdiction does not insulate a
party from litigation nor is it a legitimate justification for
avoiding one's own litigation obligations. This is so even
where the reasons for the absence are well-intentioned, such as
with the Rushtons' religious mission in this case.
Second, the main opinion seems to blame Maxfield for a
delay of nearly two years following his bankruptcy filing and
to suggest that Rushtons were excused from pursuing their
counterclaims during that time. But from all that appears,
Maxfield's bankruptcy petition was legitimate under federal law
and I do not see how we can fault him for taking advantage of
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his rights under this federal scheme. That being the case, 11
U.S.C. § 362 stayed the Rushtons and the state from pursuing
their claims against him. Of course, this "automatic stay"
protects the debtor from the prosecution of actions against
him, but does not, of itself, excuse him from proceeding with
his. actions pending against others. Nonetheless, the debtor's
claims pending against others become the property of the
bankruptcy estate and where the bankruptcy is one where a
trustee is appointed, the trustee succeeds the debtor as real
party in interest relative to those claims. The trustee enjoys
the authority to administer the claims, i.e., pursue them,
settle them, or abandon them as the trustee may deem
appropriate. Thus, Maxfield may not be responsible for the
inactivity in the instant action which followed his bankruptcy
filing. Even if he is, the delay may be entirely legitimate
depending on the objectives and status of the bankruptcy cases
and the ongoing progress of liquidation or reorganization.
Conversely, one who has an action pending against a party
who files a bankruptcy petition—as with the Rushtons and their
counterclaim against Maxfield—is not altogether helpless in
the face of the bankruptcy filing. With leave of the
bankruptcy court, as ultimately was obtained here, the claim
can be pursued in state court at least to the point of
liquidating the claim or, with consent of the non-bankruptcy
party, can be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court. Depending
on the particular case, waiting two years to request relief
from the stay may or may not be consistent with appropriate
diligence on the part of Rushton and the state.
In short, lengthy delays in state court litigation, for
which "bankruptcy" is offered up as the major excuse, should be
carefully scrutinized. Bankruptcy is simply not the hinderance
to the timely resolution of disputes pending in state court
which many would have state court judges believe.
The parties to the main action in this case sparred and
postured for some seven years, showing little inclination to
get their claims resolved on the merits. The system had been
burdened long enough. Dismissal for failure to timely
prosecute was an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion.

Gregory J^brme,

Judge
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TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of
Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah,
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre^
tion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this
court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course ofjudicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this court.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 44. Certification and transmission of record; filing;
parties.
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case.
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21.
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases.
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rehearing or joined in the petition for rehearing) runs from the date of the
denial of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the
rehearing.
(d) Time for cross-petition.
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed:
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of this
rule; or
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari.
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to Paragraph (d)(1)(B) of
this rule will not be granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certiorari of another party to the case is granted.
(e) Extension of time. This court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a cross-petition for a
writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration
of the time prescribed by Paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule, whichever is applicable. Any such motion which is filed before expiration of the prescribed time
may be ex parte, unless the court otherwise requires. Notice of any such
motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to
the other parties. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time
or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever
occurs later.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 46. Petition for writ of certiorari.
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order
here indicated:
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in this court
contains the names of all parties.
(2) A table of contents with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities
cited, with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited.
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumentative or repetitious. General conclusory statements, such as 'Hlie decision
of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not
acceptable. The statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered
by the court.
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions
issued by the Court of Appeals.
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of this
court is invoked, showing:
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of
time within which to petition for certiorari;
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Rule 46

(C) reliance upon Rule 44(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; and
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer on this court jurisdiction to review the decision in question by a writ of certiorari.
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and
regulations that the case involves, setting them out verbatim and giving
the appropriate citation therefor. If the controlling provisions involved
are lengthy, their citation alone will suffice at this point and their pertinent text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in Subparagraph
(10) of this paragraph.
(8) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its disposition in
the lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to
the issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record before
and to the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise argument for the issuance of the writ. (See Rule 43.)
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order:
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting
opinions, and all orders, including any order on rehearing, delivered
by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B) copies of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law,
orders, judgments, or decrees that were rendered in the case or in
companion cases by the Court of Appeals and by other courts or by
administrative agencies and that are relevant to the questions presented (each of those documents shall include the caption showing
the name of the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the
case, and the date of its entry); and
(C) any other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that are
relevant to the questions presented but were not entered in the case
that is the subject of the petition.
If the material that is required by Subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this paragraph is voluminous, such may, if more convenient, be separately presented.
(b) Form of petition. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply with
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except that the cover of the
petition shall be white. The clerk shall examine all petitions before filing, and
if a petition is not prepared in accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and this
paragraph, it will not be filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared.
(c) No separate brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in Subparagraph (a) (9) of this rule. No separate brief in support of a petition for a writ of
certiorari will be received, and the clerk will refuse to file any petition for a
writ of certiorari to which is annexed or appended any supporting brief.
(d) Page limitation. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as
possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Subparagraph (a)(7) of
this rule, and the appendix.
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(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity. The failure of a petitioner
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready
and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a
sufficient reason for denying the petition.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 47. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus
curiae.
(a) Brief in opposition. The respondent shall have 30 days (unless enlarged by the court pursuant to Rule 22(b)) after service of a petition in which
to file ten copies of an opposing brief, disclosing any matter or ground why the
case should not be reviewed by this court. Such brief shall comply with the
requirements of Rule 46, as applicable, and comply with the form of a brief as
specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except that the cover of the brief shall be orange.
The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in
accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. Four copies of the brief
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately
represented.
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 46(a)(7), and
the appendix.
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction
of the court to grant the writ of certiorari may be included in the brief in
opposition.
(d) Distribution of filings^ Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file,
the petition and the brief, if any, will be distributed by the clerk to the court
for consideration. However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been
filed, distribution of both it and the petition for a writ of certiorari will be
delayed until the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file.
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the
brief in opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under
paragraph (d) hereof will not be delayed pending the filing of any such brief.
Such brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages. Such
brief shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3),
except that the cover of the brief shall be yellow. The clerk shall examine all
briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule
27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be filed, but shall be returned
to be properly prepared Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four copies
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately
represented.
(0 Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only if
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the court granted on
motion, or at the request of the court. A motion for leave shall identify the
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus
curiae is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae
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(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity. The failure of a petitioner
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready
and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a
sufficient reason for denying the petition.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 47. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus
curiae.
(a) Brief in opposition. The respondent shall have 30 days (unless enlarged by the court pursuant to Rule 22(b)) after service of a petition in which
to file ten copies of an opposing brief, disclosing any matter or ground why the
case should not be reviewed by this court. Such brief shall comply with the
requirements of Rule 46, as applicable, and comply with the form of a brief as
specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except that the cover of the brief shall be orange.
The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in
accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. Four copies of the brief
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately
represented.
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 46(a)(7), and
the appendix.
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction
of the court to grant the writ of certiorari may be included in the brief in
opposition.
(d) Distribution of filings. Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file,
the petition and the brief, if any, will be distributed by the clerk to the court
for consideration. However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been
filed, distribution of both it and the petition for a writ of certiorari will be
delayed until the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file.
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the
brief in opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under
paragraph (d) hereof will not be delayed pending the filing of any such brief.
Such brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages. Such
brief shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3),
except that the cover of the brief shall be yellow. The clerk shall examine all
briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule
27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be filed, but shall be returned
to be properly prepared. Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four copies
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately
represented.
(f) Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only if
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the court granted on
motion, or at the request of the court. A motion for leave shall identify the
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus
curiae is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae
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Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance.
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for
the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties
or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such
other manner as the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute.
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the court may in
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon
good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of
evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to
procure it. The court may also require the party seeking the continuance to
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if
the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be given, and
that it may be considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground.
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present If required by the adverse
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have
the testimony of any witness present taken, in the same manner as if at the
trial; and the testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same
effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made with respect to a
deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32 (c)(3)(A) and
Compiler's Notes. — Following the amendment of Rule 32, effective January 1,1987, the
reference to Rule 32(c)(1) and (2), at the end of
Subdivision (c), should now be to Rule
32(c)(3)(A) and (B).

Subdivision (a) of this ruleas similar to Rule
40, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence, continuance upon,
Rule 15(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Postponement
—Absence of party.
—Discretion of court.
—Inability of counsel to attend trial.
Unavoidable absence.
—New theory of case.
—Procedural delays
—Supporting affidavits.
—Unavailable witness.
Lack of diligence.
Need.
Cited.
Postponement
—Absence of party.
Continuance would not be granted because
of absence of a party, unless he was a material
witness, and, if so, the facts expected to be
proved by him had to be stated under oath,
unless the oath was waived It was also neces-

sary that party had used due diligence to be
present at the trial McGrath v. Tallent, 7
Utah 256, 26 P. 574 (1891).
Refusal of trial court to postpone trial was
not abuse of discretion where case was set
down for trial, and had once before been continued because of absence of party who was
principal witness, and second continuance was
sought by attorney who was not of record in
case Lancino v. Smith, 36 Utah 462, 105 P.
914 (1909).
Refusal to grant continuance in personal injury case was an abuse of discretion where
plaintiff was not able to attend the trial because of his physical condition, there was no
evidence of malingering by the plaintiff, and
the plaintiffs testimony was essential to his
case. Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373
P.2d 375 (1962).
—Discretion of court
Denial of motion for continuance was within
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discretion of trial court. Sharp v. Canakis
Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 225 P. 337 (1924).
Trial courts have substantial discretion in
deciding whether to grant continuances.
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah
1988).
—Inability of counsel to attend trial.
The inability of counsel to be present at the
time set for trial does not necessarily entitle
his client to a continuance. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Unavoidable absence.
When counsel has made timely objections,
given necessary notice, and has made a reasonable effort to have the trial date changed for
good cause, it would be an abuse of discretion
not to grant a continuance. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
—New theory of case.
Continuance could be obtained to develop a
theory of the case suggested after issue joined
and before trial. Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah
393 (1877).

—Supporting affidavits.
Subdivision (b) does not require affidavits to
accompany a motion for continuance. Bairas v.
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962).
—Unavailable witness.
Lack of diligence.
Where subpoena for absent witness was not
placed in hands of an officer for service until
the morning the case was called for trial,
though it had been set for several weeks, and
the witness had testified at a former trial, continuance was denied. Corporation of Members
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Watson, 30 Utah 126, 83 P. 731 (1906).
In malpractice action, motion for continuance based on plaintiffs inability to serve
subpoena on vacationing medical witness was
properly denied, where plaintiff had made no
effort to depose witness and had never contacted witness for the purpose of testifying.
Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah
1975).
Need.
Where the defendant's counsel had three
weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the
witnesses, purportedly important to his case,
were actually present at trial and thus subject
to cross-examination, the purely speculative
need for a third witness did not entitle the defendant to the granting of a motion for continuance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109
(Utah 1985).

—Procedural delays.
Court properly denied motion for continuance in action based on credit card obligation
which had been procedurally delayed for two
and a half years by interrogatories and by various motions of the defendant; and although
trial date had been set for four months, motion
for continuance was not filed until nine days
before trial. First Sec. Bank v. Johnson, 540~
Cited in Thorley v. Thorley, 579 P.2d 927
P.2d 521 (Utah 1975).
<Utah 1978). _
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance
§§ 1 to 26,43 to 53; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 25,
26.
C.J.S. — 17 C J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.;
88 CJ.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35.
A.L.R. — Admissions to prevent continuance sought to secure testimony of absent wit-

ness in civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272.
Continuance of civil case as conditioned
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.
Key Numbers. — Continuance « = l e t seq.;
Trial «= 1 to 7.

Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
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court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at
the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has
complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 41, F.RC.P.
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THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE COMES NOW ON REGULARLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.

COUNSEL APPEARING AS NOTED ABOVE.

WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED BETWEEN RESPECTIVE COUNSEL
ND THE COURT.

THE COURT NOW ORDERS THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE BE SET FOR THE

FOLLOWING (SEE BELOW) OR SETTLED.

.
DATE

(1)

DISCOVERY CUT-OFF DATE

(2)

MOTIONS

(3)

DATE FOR PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

(A)

LENGTH OF TRIAL

(5) TRIAL DATE
(6)

JURY

TIKE

OR NON-JURY
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HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. (Bar No. 2435)
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

REED MAXFIELD AND UTAH'S
GREAT GAME PRESERVE,
Plaintiffs,
J U D G M E N T

vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON,
et al,
Defendants.
OWEN A . RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON,

Third Party
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C80-8167

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Third Party Defendant
and Third Party
Plaintiff,
Judge:

David Young

vs.
REED MAXFIELD,
Third Party Defendant.
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This matter came on for pre-trial conference on Monday/
August 31, 1987, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. by order of the court.
Personal appearances were entered by the plaintiff, Reed Maxfield;
plaintiff's counsel, Charles C. Brown and Jeffrey B. Brown;
defendants Rushtons' counsel, Henry S. Nygaard; and counsel for
State of Utah, namely:
Leonard McGee.

Steven Schwendiman, Bernard Tanner and

The plaintiff, Reed Maxfield, and his legal

counsel argued that the issues of the Second Amended Complaint
included those set forth in plaintiff's proposed Third Amended
Complaint, a 1983 civil rights cause of action, and that Steven
Schwendiman be designated as a John Doe defendant.

Plaintiff's

counsel moved that they be allowed to withdraw upon the grounds
that plaintiff has not consummated a fee agreement with counsel;
counsel for the defendants Rushton and the State of Utah argued
that all relevant issues were set forth in plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint and the defendants' responsive pleadings including their Answers, Crossclaims, and Counterclaims.
The court, after reviewing the pleadings and exhibits on
file, having heard arguments from the plaintiff personally, and
counsel for all the parties, and being fully advised in the
premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff's causes of action be dismissed for fail-

ure to timely prosecute.

-2-
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2.

Rights of redemption shall commence to run upon exe-

cution of this Judgment.
3.

Defendants are awarded costs.

DATED this

3^

day of

5 ^ H ^

1987.

BY THE COURT:

tj

J^JL

^ w h^^i

Judge
3qe tfavid Younq

?

tT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA

By:
Charles C. Brown
Counsel for Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH

Bertnara Tanner7
Assistant Attornfe$_General
Counsel for State of Utah
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OCT 05 1987
HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. (Bar No. 2435)
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

Of/ice of ATTORNEY GENERAL

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

REED MAXFIELD AND UTAH'S
GREAT GAME PRESERVE,
Plaintiffs,
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON,
et al,
Defendants.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON,
Third Party
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C80-8167
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Third Party Defendant
and Third Party
Plaintiff,
Judge:

David Young

vs.
REED MAXFIELD,
Third Party Defendant.

i\ n o r n r i T V

T—1

TO ALL PARTIES:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Judgment was entered in
favor the defendants on the 30th day of September, 1987, by the
Honorable David Young.
DATED this

A copy of the Judgment is attached.
£

day of October, 1987.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

By:
37/Ny^aar
HenrysTTNygaard
Attorney for Defendants Owen A.
Rushton and Carol Rushton

•2~

APPFWnTY

T-?

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
) SS:
)

MARGARET A. NELSON, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Beaslin, Nygaard,
Coke & Vincent, attorneys for defendants Owen A. and Carol
Rushton herein; that she served the attached NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT upon:
Bernard Tanner, Esq.
Asst. Attorney General
130 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Mr. Reed Maxfield
410 East 7620 South
Midvale, UT 84047
Charles C. Brown, Esq.
Jeffrey B. Brown, Esq.
Brown, Smith & Hanna
City Centre I, Suite 401
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and
depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on
the 3^
day of October, 1987.

Hargatfet A. Nelson
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
October, 1987.

day of

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:
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